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Abstract: In Shapley (1964) several conditions are given for the existence ofpure saddlepoints for a 
matrix game. In this paper we show that only a few of these conditions, when translated to the 
situation of a bimatrix game guarantee the existence of pure equilibria. Further, we associate with a 
bimatrix game a directed graph as well as a so-called 'binary game'. If this graph has no cycles, then 
the bimatrix game in question has a pure equilibrium. It is shown that the binary game for a bimatrix 
game without a pure equilibrium possesses a 'fundamental' subgame, which can be characterized by
means of 'minimal' cycles. 
I Introduction 
In Shapley (1964) various (sufficient) conditions are given for the existence of 
pure saddlepoints for matrix games. Each of these conditions requires that every 
submatrix of some fixed size has a pure saddlepoint. These conditions can easily 
be extended to bimatrix games, but what can be said about he existence of pure 
equilibria? In section 3 we give an example of a bimatrix game which satisfies all 
the various conditions of Shapley, translated to the situation for bimatrix games. 
This game however, does not have a pure equilibrium. Since this example 
concerns a square game, it does not fully account for the general situation. 
Indeed, in section 4, we show that some of Shapley's conditions are still useful 
to obtain pure equilibrium results for non-square bimatrix games. Furthermore 
we introduce for a bimatrix game the binary game. This is a bimatrix game 
which assigns for a player a payoff 1 to a pair of pure strategies if (in the original 
game) the strategy of this player is a pure best reply to the strategy of his 
opponent. To other pairs of pure strategies a payoff 0 is assigned. Next a directed 
graph is associated with the binary game. We give another condition for the 
existence of a pure equilibrium for a bimatrix game in terms of cycles in this 
graph. Note that also Smadici (1979) used graph theoretical methods to general- 
ize a result of Shapley (1964) concerning eneralized saddlepoints of matrix 
games to the case of a bimatrix game. In section 5 we study games without a 
pure equilibrium. For such games the binary game possesses a specific subgame, 
which is called a fundamental subgame. These fundamental subgames are char- 
acterized by means of 'minimal' cycles and their form is described in section 6. 
0340- 9422/93/38 : 2/203 - 212 $2.50 9 1993 Physica-Verlag, Heidelberg 
204 
2 Preliminaries 
P. Jurg et al. 
Let A = [au]~%l ~=1 " and B = [b0]~"= 17=x be two m x n-matrices. The m x n- 
bimatrix game (A, B) is defined as the two-person game in strategic form where 
player 1 chooses a row, i.e. an i e M := {1 . . . . .  m} and independently player 2 
chooses a column, i.e. a j  e N := {1 . . . .  , n}. Accordingly player 1 obtains a payoff 
aij and player 2 obtains a payoff bii. These payoffs can be found in the ij th entry 
(aij, bij ) of the bimatrix (A, B). 
A pair (io,Jo) of a row and a column is called an equilibrium for (A, B) if 
unilateral deviation does not yield a higher payoff, i.e. 
aioJo = max aij ~ 
i 
bioJo = max bioj 9 
J 
(2.1) 
Since we don't consider the mixed extension of a game in this paper, we don't 
use the word pure. For non-empty subsets I of M and J of N we denote by 
(A, B)I. s the subgame of(A, B) where player 1 and 2 restrict heir choices to a row 
in I and to a column in J respectively. For 1 < r < m and 1 < s < n an r x s- 
subgame of (A, B) is a subgame (A, B)m with 111 = r and [J[ = s. A bimatrix 
game (A, B) with B = - A is called a matrix game and denoted by A. An equilib- 
rium for a matrix game is called a saddlepoint. 
3 Some Results of Shapley on Saddlepoints 
In Shapley (1964) the following results concerning the existence of saddlepoints 
for matrix games are presented. 
Theorem 3.1: Let A be an m x n-matrix game with m, n >_ 2. I f  every 2 x 2- 
subgame of  A has a saddlepoint, then A has a saddlepoint. 
Theorem 3.2: Let A be an m x n-matrix game with m, n >__ 2 and with the property 
that no two collinear entries are equal. Let 2 < r < m and 2 < s < n. Then A has 
a saddlepoint if every r • s-subgame of  A has a saddlepoint. 
Here we give an example which shows that the statements in the theorems 
above cannot be extended to bimatrix games and equilibria. We consider the 
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3 x 3-bimatrix game given by 
V(2, 1 
(3,89 [ .  
7) (4,88 j 
With respect o theorem 3.1 first note that every 2 x 2-subgame of(A, B) has an 
equilibrium, where (A, B) itself has not. With respect o theorem 3.2 we note that 
all entries of A and B are different and that also every 2 x 3- and 3 x 2-subgame 
has an equilibrium. This example also shows that another result of Shapley 
concerning so-called detached rows and columns cannot be generalized to the 
case of bimatrix games. 
4 On Sufficient Conditions for the Existence of an Equilibrium 
In this section we state two theorems which give sufficient conditions for a 
bimatrix game to possess an equilibrium. The first theorem uses conditions on 
subgames. The second theorem concerns the existence of cycles in a directed 
graph associated with the game. 
It may seem that the counterexample of the previous section exhausts all 
possibilities of finding, for bimatrix games, a result of the type of theorem 3.1 or 
3.2. However, the example concerns a square game (m = n = 3), so that there 
remain some cases of theorem 3.2 still to be examined: if m < n, those are the 
cases where r = m and m < s < n. In theorem 4.1 we show that in those cases 
theorem 3.2 can be extended to bimatrix games, and even a version where the 
entries in the same row or column can be the same. 
Theorem 4.1: Let (A, B) be an m x n-bimatrix game with m <_ n. Let m <_ s <_ n. 
Then (A, B) has an equilibrium if every m x s-subgame of (A, B) has an equilib- 
rium. 
Proof: We show that if (A, B) has no equilibrium, then for all s with m < s < n 
there is an m x s-subgame of (A, B) that has also no equilibrium. So suppose 
(A, B) has no equilibrium and let m < s < n. We can choose for each i ~ M a 
j ~ N such that b u = max~ N bu. Let J '  be the subset of N consisting of these 
columns. Then I J'l < m. We add to J', if necessary, arbitrary columns in order 
to have s columns. By J we denote the subset of N obtained in this way. Then 
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(A, B)M,s is an m x s-subgame of (A, B). Suppose that (i,j) is an equilibrium for 
(A, B)M,j. Then aij = max~Makj and b o = maxims b/~ = maxz~Nbi~ since J' ~ J. 
Hence (i, j) is also an equilibrium for (A, B). This contradicts the assumption. 
In order to find a new condition which quarantees xistence of an equilibrium 
for a bimatrix game, we first look at a simplified version of a bimatrix game, 
which we call, for obvious reasons, the binary game. 
For an m x n-bimatrix game (A, B) we define the binary game (A*, B*) by 
A*  * " = [a i j ] i= l  n B* , m , i=1 and = [bij]~=l i=1 with 
{iifa :maxa  { ifb max i 
a* := k and b*:= t 
otherwise otherwise .
(4.1) 
Clearly (A*, B*) is a bimatrix game. Let (i0,Jo) be an equilibrium for (A*, B*). 
By (4.1), for every row i there is a column l such that b* = 1 and for every column 
j there is a row k such that a~ = 1. Then, by (2.1), the ioJto h entry of (A*, B*) is 
(1, 1). By (4.1) again this implies that (io,Jo) is an equilibrium for (A, B). Con- 
versely, if(io,Jo ) is an equilibrium for (A, B), then by (2.1) and (4.1) we have that 
the ioj~ h entry of(A*, B*) is (1, 1), which implies that (io, jo ) is an equilibrium for 
(A*, B*). Hence we have a proof of 
Lemma 4.1: Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game. Then a pair of  a row and a column is 
an equilibrium for (A, B) if and only if this pair is an equilibrium for (A*, B*). 
Next we will associate with (the binary game of) an m x n-bimatrix game 
(A, B) a directed graph fg(A*, B*). The points of this graph are the elements of 
M x N. An arc in the graph is an ordered pair of points ((i,j), (i', j ')) with the 
property 
a*=0,  a*j,= 1 and j= j '  
or  
bi* = O, b*j, = l and i = i' . 
We say that the arc ((i, j), (i', j')) leaves (i, j) and enters (i', j'). Clearly an arc either 
reflects a unilateral deviation of player 1 in order to increase his payoff (from 0 
to 1 in the binary game) or a unilateral deviation of the second player with the 
same purpose. 
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A sequence C := ((il,ja), (i2,j2), ..., (it,L)) of t > 1 points is called a cycle 
in f~(A*, B*) if, for each s e {1 . . . . .  t - 1}, ((is,L), (is+l,L+l)) is an arc and if 
((i,,j,), (i1,jl)) is an arc. We say that these are arcs in C and for s ~ {1, 2, ..., t}, 
we call (is, Js) a point of C. The thus defined graph can be represented by a picture 
of the entries of the binary game, with an arrow pointed from one entry to 
another if there exists an arc that leaves the (point corresponding to the) first of 
these two entries and enters the (point corresponding to the) second one. 
Example 1: The binary game of the game following theorem 3.2 is 
(1,0) (0, 1) (0,0) 1 
(0,0) (1,0) (0,1) . 
(0,1) (0,0) (1,0) 
A representation f the graph associated with this game is 
1 
0~0) 
(0, 0) 
l(o, 11 ,-----  
, (0 ,1 )  ~- - -  
(1, o) 
J 
I 
I 
(0, 0) 
(0, 0),,, 
\ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
, (0,1) 1 
I 
I 
! 
l 
1 
/ 
(1, O) r 
The non-dotted arrows in this figure represent the only cycle in the graph. -~ 
Now we can formulate our second result on the existence of equilibria. 
Theorem 4.2: If for a bimatrix game (A, B) there is no cycle in f#(A*, B*), then 
(A, B) has an equilibrium. 
Proof: If there is no cycle in f~(A*, B*), one can find a point (i,j) of this graph 
for which there is no arc leaving it. Then by lemma 4.1, (a*, b~)~ (0, 0). If 
(a 0, bij ) = (1, 0), the fact that there is no arc leaving (i, j) implies that b~ :~ I for 
all 1. This however is impossible in view of the definition of the binary game. In 
an analogous way one shows that the case (a*, b*) = (0, 1) cannot occur. So 
(aii, b~j) = (1, 1) and by lemma 4.1 the proof is complete. <~ 
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In the next example we show that if a bimatrix game has an equilibrium, there 
can be a cycle in the graph associated with this game. 
Example 2. For the 3 x 3-bimatrix game 
[(1,0) (0, 1) (0,0)] 
(A,B):= /(1,1) (1,0) (0,1) 
[(o, l) (o, o) (1, o) 
(A*, B*) = (A, B) and the representation f N(A*, B*) is 
,(1, 0) 
I 
I 
I 
(1, 1) ~- - -  
, (o, ~) ~ - - -  (o, o ) ,  
\ 
, (0,1) (1, 0) 
I 
t 
I 
- - -  (o, o) ~(o, l) ,,- 0 ,o )  r 
Clearly C := ((1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 3), (3, 1)> is a cycle (represented bythe 
non-dotted arrows). However, (2, 1) is an equilibrium for (A, B). 
5 Games Without an Equilibrium 
The game in example 1 has a special property: although the game itself has no 
equilibrium, every subgame of it has one. We will consider games with this 
property - or more generally subgames with this property - more closely. 
Let (A, B) be an m x n-bimatrix game and let I c M and J c N be non- 
empty. We call the subgame (A*, B*)I, s of (A*, B*) fundamental, if firstly 
(A*, B*)I,I has no equilibrium and secondly if for every I' c I and J' c J with 
I' # I or J' # J the subgame (A*, B*)r,j, does have an equilibrium. 
For a bimatrix game without an equilibrium, the binary game does not have 
an equilibrium either. If this binary game is not fundamental, it has a subgame 
without an equilibrium. If this subgame again is not fundamental, then there is 
a subgame of this subgame without an equilibrium. Since a bimatrix game has 
only finitely many subgathes, this reasoning leads to 
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Theorem 5.1: Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game without an equilibrium. Then (A*, B*) 
has a fundamental subgame. 
The converse of this theorem is not true. If we skip the first row and first 
column of the game 
F(1, 1) (0,0) (0,0) l  
(A, B) = |(0, 0) (1,0) (0,1) J L(o,o) (o, 1) (1, o) 
we obtain a fundamental subgame of (A*, B*) = (A, B) and (1, 1) is an equilib- 
rium of (A, B). 
By theorem 4.2, there exists at least one cycle in the graph associated with a 
bimatrix game without an equilibrium. In order to show that fundamental 
subgames are strongly related to special cycles, we define for a bimatrix game 
(A, B) and a cycle C in if(A*, B*) 
I(C) := {il(i,j) is a point of C for some j} 
and 
J(C) := {jl(i,j) is a point of C for some i} . 
The cycle C is called minimal if for every cycle C' with I(C') c I(C) and J(C') 
J(C) we have I(C') = 1(C) and J(C') = J(C). 
In the following lemma we describe some useful properties of cycles. 
Lemma 5.1: Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game and let C be a cycle in t(A*,  B*). Then 
1) if (i,j) is a point of C, then (a*, bi*) ~ {(0, 1), (1, 0)}, 
2) for every i ~ I(C) there is a j ~ J(C) such that (as*, bi*) = (0, 1), 
3) for every j ~ J(C) there is an i ~ I(C) such that (a*, bi*) = (1, 0). 
Proof." We only prove (1) and (2). 
1) For a point (i,j) of C, there is an arc entering (i,j) and an arc leaving (i,j). 
If (air, bit) = (1, 1), no arc leaves (i,j) and if (a o, bit) = (0, 0), no arc enters 
(i,j). 
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2) Let i ~ I(C). Then there is a j  e J(C) such that (i,j) is a point of C. According 
* * (a*, b*) = (0, 1). In the latter case the to 1), then either (a0, bi~) = (1, 0) or 
proof is complete. So suppose that (a*, b*) = (1, 0). Since (i,j) is a point of C, 
there is an arc in C that leaves (i, j). By the definition of an arc this implies 
that there is a j '  such that ((i,j), (i,j')) is this arc and hi*, = 1. Then, in view of 
1) and the fact that (i,j') is a point of C, a*, = 0. < 
The following lemma makes clear in which situation cycles appear. 
Lemma 5.2: Let (A, B) be an m x n-bimatrix game and let I ~ M and J c N be 
non-empty. I f  (A*, B*)I, J has no equilibrium, then there is a cycle C in if(A*, B*) 
such that I(C) ~ I and J(C) ~ J. 
Proof: Let (A*, B*)I.j have no equilibrium. Assume that there is no cycle C in 
if(A*, B*) such that 1(C) ~ I and J(C) ~ J. Then there exists a point (i,j) with 
i E I andj  ~ J such that there is no arc which leaves (i,j) and enters ome other 
point (i',j') with i' ~ I andj '  ~ J. Then, by the definition of an arc, a* = 0 implies 
ak~ = 0 for all k r / and hi* = 0 implies b* = 0 for all l ~ J. Hence, if a* = bi* = 0, 
then a* = maxk~1a~ and b* = maxz~sb*. Clearly these equalities also hold if 
, a* = 1 or bi* = 1. So (i,j) is an equilibrium for (A*, B )1,j. This contradicts our 
assumption. Hence there is a cycle C in if(A*, B*) with I(C) ~ I and J(C) c J. 
Theorem 5.2: Let (A, B) be an m x n-bimatrix game without an equilibrium and let 
I c M and J ~ N be non-empty. Then (A*, B*)I,j is a fundamental subgame of 
(A*, B*) /f and only if I = I(C) and J = J(C) for some minimal cycle C in 
~(A*, B*). 
Proof." (a) First let (A*, B*)t.j be a fundamental subgame of (A*, B*). Then 
(A*, B*)t,s has no equilibrium. Hence, by lemma 5.2, there is a cycle C in 
if(A*, B*) such that I(C) c I and J(C) c J. Let C' be a cycle in if(A*, B*) such 
that I(C') c I(C) and J(C') c J(C). Since (A*, B*)l,j has no equilibrium, it has 
no entry (1, 1). If(A*, B*)l(c,),s~c, ~has an equilibrium, say (i,j), then by 2) and 3) 
= = B )xtc'),stc') has no equilibrium. of lemma 5.1, a* b.*.,j 1. Consequently, (A*, * 
Since (A*, B*)l,s is fundamental, this implies I(C') = I and J(C') = J. Hence 
I(C) = I and J(C) = J and C is minimal. 
(b) Secondly, let C be a minimal cycle in if(A*, B*). As in part (a) and using 
the fact that (A*, B*) has no entry (1, 1), one shows that (A*, B*)~(c),s~c) has 
no equilibrium. Let I ~ I(C), J ~ J(C) and 1 r I(C) or J ~ J(C). Suppose 
(A*, B*)t,s has no equilibrium. Then, by lemma 5.2, there is a cycle C' in 
if(A*, B*) such that I (C ' )~ I and J (C ' )~ J. Since C is minimal, this is a 
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contradiction. So (A*, B*)t,j has an equilibrium for every I c I(C) and d ~ J(C) 
with I ~ 1(C) or J 4= J(C). This implies that (A*, B*)~(c),s(c) is a fundamental 
subgame. < 
In the second part of the proof of the foregoing theorem we explicitly used the 
assumption that (A, B) has no equilibrium. For the game in example 2, C := 
((1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 3), (3, 3), (3, 1)) is a minimal cycle (represented by the 
non-dotted arrows) and (A*, B*)i(c),J(c) = (A*, B*). However, since (2, 1) is an 
equilibrium for (A*, B*), this game is not a fundamental subgame. So this 
example shows that the assumption of theorem 5.2 is essential. 
6 The Fundamental Subgame 
In this section we use the concept of a minimal cycle to describe the form of a 
fundamental subgame. 
Let (A, B) be an m x n-bimatrix game without an equilibrium and let I c M 
and J c N be such that (A*, B*)t,j is a fundamental subgame of (A*, B*). By 
theorem 5.2, there is a minimal cycle C in fr B*) such that I = I(C) and 
J = J(C). After permuting, if necessary, the rows and columns of (A*, B*) we 
may suppose that 1 = {1, 2 . . . . .  s) and J = {1, 2 . . . . .  t} for some s, t ~ ~ and 
that (a11, hi1) = (1, 0) (see lemma 5.1). 
We will show that s = t and that the rows and columns of (A*, B*) can be 
permuted in such a way that 
(A*, B*)1,s = 
-(1,0) (0, 1) ... 
(1, o) (o, 1) . . .  
(1, o) . . .  
9 -. (o, 1) 
9 -. (1,0) (0,1) 
(0, 1) ... (1, O) 
(6.1) 
where the entries that are not indicated are equal to (0, 0). 
The proof consists of several steps. 
1) By 2) of lemma 5.1 there is a j ~ J such that (a'j, b*i)= (0, 1). We may 
suppose that j  = 2. By 3) of lemma 5.1 there is an i ~ I such that (a'z, b*) = 
(1, 0). We may suppose that i = 2. 
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2) By 2) of lemma 5.1 there is a j  ~ J such that (a'j, b~) = (0, 1) . I f j  = 1, then 
:= <(1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 1)) is a cycle in f~(A*, B*). Since I(C) c 1(C) and 
J(~) c J(C), 1(C) = I(6") and J(C) = J(6") in view of the minimality of C. So 
in this case s = t = 2 and (A*, B*)x,s has the form as described in (6.1). If j  > 2, 
we may suppose that j = 3. 
3) By 3) of lemma 5.1, there is an i ~ 1 such that (a*, b3) = (1, 0).If i = 1, then 
:= ((1, 2), (2, 2), (2, 3), (1, 3)) is a cycle in f#(A*, B*) with I(C) ~ I(C) and 
J(C) c J(C). The fact that 1 ~ J(C) and 1 r J(C) contradicts the minimality 
of C. So i > 2 and we may suppose that i = 3. 
4) We can proceed in this way until we arrive at the situation that (a,, b,,) = 
(I, 0). Then by 2) of lemma 5.1 there is a j r J such that (a~, bt*) = (0, 1). 
However j < t. I f j  # 1, we can derive a contradiction like we did in part 3). 
So j=  1. 
5) Also if one of the entries not indicated in (6.1) is not equal to (0, 0), we can 
derive a contradiction like in part 3). 
6) So we have found that s > t and that 6" := ((1, 1), (1, 2), (2, 2) . . . .  , (t - 1, t), 
(t, t), (t, 1)) is a cycle in fq(A*, B*). As in part 2) one can show that I(C) = 
I(~'). So s = t. 
Since one easily shows that a subgame of(A*, B*) with the form as described in 
(6.1) is fundamental, we have shown 
Theorem 6.1: Let (A, B) be a bimatrix game without an equilibrium. Then a 
subgame of (A*, B*) is fundamental if and only if it is a square game with the form 
as in (6.1) (/f necessary after permuting the rows and columns of (A*, B*)). 
Note that in fact theorem 6.1 also gives a description of the form of a minimal 
cycle. 
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